Riley v. Spiral Butte Development, LLC Appellant\u27s Reply Brief Dckt. 40061 by unknown
UIdaho Law
Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law
Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs
2-6-2013
Riley v. Spiral Butte Development, LLC Appellant's
Reply Brief Dckt. 40061
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/
idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs
This Court Document is brought to you for free and open access by Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Idaho
Supreme Court Records & Briefs by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law.
Recommended Citation
"Riley v. Spiral Butte Development, LLC Appellant's Reply Brief Dckt. 40061" (2013). Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs. 769.
https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs/769
Michael J. Whyte, Esq., ISB #4645 
THOMSEN STEPHENS LAW OFFICES, PLLC 
2635 Channing Way 
Idaho Falls ID 83404 
Telephone (208)522-1230 
Fax (208)522-1277 
Attorney for Plaintiff/ Appellees 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
·NORMAN RILEY and ROBIN RILEY, 










SPIRAL BUTTE DEVELOPMENT, LLC, ) 
an Oregon Limited Liability Company; 
JIM HORKLEY, an individual; and 







Docket No.: 40061-2012 
Case No. CV-08-145 
APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF 
COME NOW Appellant Rileys and hereby submit this Reply Brief in the above referenced 
action. 
1. \VERE THERE ANY MATERIAL ISSUES OF FACT RELATING TO THE 
RILEYS' BREACH OF THE LEASE OPTION AGREEMENT 
Horkley claims in his Brief, that there were no material issues of fact raised with the District 
Court with regard to payments owed under the lease as well as all other lease requirements. Riley's 
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agree that the Lease Option Agreement requires compliance with the terms of the Agreement at the 
time the option to purchase was exercised. Rileys disagree that they had defaulted any portion of 
the Agreement. 
The first issue was the payment of the rent. As indicated in Rileys' Appellant Brief, after 
Horkley and Rileys reached an Agreement for Rileys to tlli-m the property, Rileys and Horkley jointly 
agreed that Howard and Mark Jensen would take over the farming of the property until the Rileys 
were able to start farming. Horkley was aware that the Rileys were involved in a bankruptcy and did 
not have the equipment to operate the farm. Because of this knowledge the parties were jointly 
working toward a resolution to keep the Lease Option Agreement viable. The Rileys' financial 
problems were known to Horkley before he loaned the Rileys money pursuant to the Lease Option 
Agreement. R. Vol. I, p. 184. Horkley knew, or should have knovvn that Rileys were not currently 
in a position to farm and complete the Lease Option Agreement without assistance. Knowing all this 
information, Horkley and Riley jointly agree to have Jensens farm the property and pay the rental. 
The District Court held, and Horkley claims in his brief that there was no evidence that the rental 
obligation of $102,500 was to be paid by Jensens. This is not accurate. Norman Riley provided 
testimony that he and Horkley agreed for Jensen to pay close to $105,000. 
Q. And what was the oral agreement on how much he was to pa,)tm the 
lease? Just a dollar figure he was to repay you for leasing it. 
A There wasn't a dollar figure to pay me. There was a dollar figure that 
he was trying to round and make the $105,000. A11d the guideline to 
make the $105,000 was, he was going to pay Jensen was going to 
pay $200 an acre cash rent for the 450 acres. He was going to get the 
additional water right on the south 150 primary water rights of - on 
Katherine Rowan's property. That he was going to collect $100 an 
acre for that water rights, which amounted to $15, 000. 
R. Vol. I, p. 110. 
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According to this testimony, thtrf;uU lease amount that was owed under the Lease Option 
Agreement was to be covered by Jensens. This testimony regarding the payment of the full amount 
from Jensens was ignored by the District Court when it concluded that the full amount of the lease 
amount was not covered in the agreement when Jensens were going to be farming the property. 
There remains a material issue of fact regarding the payment of the lease amount under the Lease 
Option Agreement. 
Horkley further states that the Rileys were in breach of the Lease Option Agreement for the 
failure of the other terms of the Lease Option Agreement. Specifically the claimed breaches of: 
1. Maintenance of equipment; 
2. Payment of taxes; 
3. Payments on all equipment; 
4. Water Assessments; 
5. Payment of utilities; 
6. Maintaining insurance; and 
7. Use of the property. 
Rileys do not dispute that the Lease Option Agreement required the Rileys to pay for or 
provide those items. However, once the parties reached the agreement that Jensens would take over 
the operation of the farm, there was the agreement that all matters would be taken over. Horkley 
referenced in his brief the exchange that took place between Nonnan Riley and Horkley when the 
two were discussing having a third party (Jensen) take over the farm operation. During that 
exchange, Riley specifically asked that all the payments get made, to which Horkley agreed they 
would. R. Vol. I, p. 125. This was a reference to all the other items under the Lease Option 
Agreement. Horkley advised Norman Riley that all payments would be made which in tum would 
relieve Rileys of those ongoing obligations. After that, Horkley never contacted Rileys requesting 
payment for any of the above referenced items, nor did Horkley provide information to Rileys about 
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amounts that Horkley wanted the Rileys to pay. R. Vol. I, p. 124. Additionally, there was no 
for the Rileys to obtain the information to provide for the above referenced issues. By agreement 
with Horkley, Rileys were not in physical control of the property. Because Rileys were not in 
physical control of the real property, they did not have the information to maintain and pay for the 
above items. Additionally, they were not aware that the Jensens were not paying the amounts Riley 
believed was supposed to be paid. R. Vol. I, p. 124. Rileys believed that the Jensens were paying 
all amounts obligated under the Lease Option Agreement and Horkley never advised them otherwise. 
R. Vol. I, p. 124. 
2. IF THERE WAS A SEPARATE ORAL LEASE, DID THE DISTRICT COURT 
COR'RECTL Y THAT IT WAS BARRED BY THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS 
Horkley argues that the agreement with Jensens is immaterial to whether or not Rileys 
breached the Lease Option Agreement with Horkley. However, it is this agreement between Horkley 
and Rileys to have Jensens farm the property that confirms the terms of the Lease Option Agreement 
were satisfied and further preserves Riley's ability to exercise their option to purchase the 
property. Both Rileys and Horkley agree that because of Rileys financial difficulties the Jensens 
would take over the operation. R. Vol. I, pp. 169, 184, 189. The District Court, in its decision 
granting summary judgment to Horkley held that the oral lease agreement was a separate agreement 
between Horkley and Jensen and therefore unenforceable in this matter because it did not satisfy the 
statute of frauds. If this agreement between Horkley and Rileys was a separate oral agreement, Riley 
contends that the oral agreement between Rileys and Horkley to substitute Jensens into the 
agreement is enforceable. That agreement would have preserved Rileys' option to purchase the 
property at the end of the lease term. Rileys' reference in the initial briefing to partial performance 
of the oral agreement was to show that oral agreement behveen Rileys and Horkley had not only 
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been agreed to, but also partially performed. It is undisputed that Rileys and Horkley agreed to have 
Jensen take over for Riley. R. Vol. I, pp. 169, 184, 189. It was also undisputed that there was 
performance of this agreement. That agreement and paitial performance would have pulled their oral 
agreement from the statute of frauds. 
On the other hand, if the oral agreement between Horkley and Rileys is treated not as a 
separate oral agreement but instead as a modification of the Lease Option Agreement, then it is still 
enforceable and preserves the remaining terms of the Lease Option Agreement. The parties' course 
of conduct implies the modification. Horkley met with Riley and both agreed to have Jensen farm 
the property. After that oral modification, Horkley and the Rileys proceeded with the agreement. 
The actions of the parties with this oral change created material issues of fact sufficient to survive 
summary judgment. 
3. DIDTHEDISTRICTCOlJRTCORc~ECTLYCONCLUDETHATTHELEASETO 
JENSENS WAS AN ORAL LEASE BETWEEN HORKLEY AND JENSENS 
UNRELATED TO THE LEASE OPTION AGREEMENT BETWEEN SPIRA.L 
BUTTE AND THE RILEYS 
Horkley states that because he informed Rileys that he was leasing to Jensens, it was separate 
and apart from the Lease Option Agreement. Horkley testified that he and Riley agreed that Jensens 
would step in until Rileys were able to complete the lease. R. Vol. I, p. 184. Riley farther testified 
that Horkley told him he wanted to lease to someone else and would make sure all payments were 
made. R. Vol. I, pp. 169. This testimony is consistent with Rileys' claims that Horkley was working 
with the Rileys to preserve the Lease Option Agreement by having the Jensens step in. It was not 
an unrelated agreement just between Horkley and Jensens that Rileys are seeking to enforce. It is 
the agreements between Horkley and the Rileys to have Jensens take over the operation until Rileys 
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v.:ere able that should have been enforced. Sufficient issues of material fact have been raised to 
survive sununary judgment and it was error for the District Court to enforcement on an separate 
agreement not between the parties at bar. 
4. WERE THE RlLEYS IN SUBSTANTIAL DEFAULT OF NUMEROUS 
PROVISIONS OF THE LEASE OPTION AGREEMENT Ac~D DID RlLEYS 
FAIL TO TENDERPATh1ENT ON OR BEFORE THE CLOSING DATE. 
The issue of whether the Rileys were in substantial default of the other provisions was 
addressed while discussing the first issue. As an additional argument, Horkley claims that the Rileys 
failed to cure the default after being advised of the default in a December 21, 2007 letter. In 
reviewing that letter, the main focus was a claim of default because the water rights associated with 
the property had been sold. R. Vol. I, pp. 141, 142. However, the issue involving water rights 
existed prior to the parties entering into the Lease Option Agreement. Horkley was aware of 
problems with the water at the time the parties entered into the Lease Option Agreement. R. Vol. 
I, pp. 108. Horkley should not be allowed to treat the issue with the water rights as a when 
the issue existed prior to the Lease Agreement and Horkley was aware of the issue. only 
reference in the December 21, 2007 letter was a general reference to the Rileys' never having taken 
possession of the property. R. Vol. I, pp. 169. However, as has already been covered previously, 
both Ri.leys and Horkley agreed that Jensen would take possession and farm until Rileys were able 
to. Horkley should not be allowed to use that claim as a default of the lease. 
With respect to the claim that Rileys never tendered the purchase price to Horkley, the Rileys 
had available to them the money from a third party, Rhett Summers. Mr. Summers testified that he 
was willing to wire money to the Rileys for them to purchase the property. However, the Rileys later 
informed him that on the day they were supposed to exercise their option Horkley did not show. R. 
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I, pp. 197-203. Mr. Suw,mers references a "coun date" when he was going to provide the 
, but he was confusing a closing with the term "court date". R. Vol. I, 206. 
5. ATTORi'JEY ON APPEAL 
Horkley has requested attorney fees on appeal. Rileys contend that they have a meritorious 
claim and have shown sufficient material issues of fact to surviving summary judgment and 
warranting a reversal the District Court's decision. Rileys met with Horkley and agreed that a 
party would take over the Lease Option Agreement until Rileys were able to. Horkley and 
Rileys pursued this course until it came time for Rileys to exercise their option to purchase the 
property from Horkley. Only then did Horkley advise that he believed the Rileys were in default and 
failed to allow Rilcys to exercise their option to purchase. Rileys' appeal was not merely a request 
to revisit and second guess the Districy Court. It has been shovm through the evidence provided that 
material issues of fact are present warranting a reversal the District Court and thus a denial of 
attorney fees on appeal. 
DATED this day ofFebrnary, 2013 
THOMSEN STEPHENS LAW OFFICES, PLLC 
By: 
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OF SERVICE 
I herebv certifv that I am a dulv licensed attomev in the 
..,, "' .,I .,; 
ofidaho, resident of and 
my office in Idaho Falls, Idaho; that on the day of February, 2013, I caused a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing APPELLANT'S ,.,,~·~"--'"' to be served upon the following persons 
at the addresses below their names either by depositing said document in the United States mail with 
the correct postage thereon or by hand delivering or by transmitting by facsimile as set forth below. 
MJW:tlh 
RONALD L SW AFFORD ESQ 
SW AFFORD LAW OFFICE 
525 NINTH STREET 
IDAHO FALLS ID 83404 
J\data\MJ\V\6525\037 Reply Briefwpd 
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[X] Mail 
[ ] Hand Delivery 
[ ] Facsimile 
THOMSEN STEPHENS LA \V OFFICES, PLLC 
By: 
